









MIB-Edited Volume  
Berlin 2015 
 
Youth, Revolt, Recognition 
The Young Generation during and after the “Arab Spring” 
Edited by Isabel Schäfer 
 
 
The „Gezi Generation“: Youth, Polarization and the „New Turkey“ 
 




Schäfer, Isabel, ed. (2015): Youth, Revolt, Recognition – The Young Generation during and after the "Arab Spring". Berlin: 
Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/HU Berlin. 
 
MIB Edited Volume | March 2015 
Project “Mediterranean Institute Berlin”, Humboldt University Berlin; www.mib.hu-berlin.de 
 
HU Online Publikation, Open Access Programm der HU. 
 
To link to this article: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100228099 
www.mib.hu-berlin.de/publikationen 
 
Projekt „Mittelmeer Institut Berlin (MIB)“ 
Project „Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)“ 
 
Institut für Sozialwissenschaften  
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin 
 
Dr. Isabel Schäfer 
Mail: i.schaefer@hu-berlin.de 
 
The MIB publication series is available online at 
https://www.mib.hu-berlin.de/ 
 




















 Table of Contents 
 
Introduction 
-  Isabel Schäfer 1 
 
Part I – Theoretical Perspectives 5 
On the Concept of Youth – Some Reflections on Theory 
-  Valeska Henze 5 
 
Part II – Youth and Politics in the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean 17 
Youth as Political Actors after the “Arab Spring”: The Case of 
Tunisia  
-  Carolina Silveira 17 
 
From The Core To The Fringe? The Political Role of Libyan 
Youth During And After The Revolution 
-  Anna Lührmann 27 
 
The Attractiveness of Political Islam for Youth in North Africa 
-  Charlotte Biegler-König 35 
 
The Role of Artistic Protest Movements in the Egyptian 
Revolution 
-  Daniel Farrell 45 
 
The „Gezi Generation“: Youth, Polarization and the „New 
Turkey“ 
-  Gözde Böcü 52 
 
Part III – Youth, Migration and the Socio-Economic Dimension
 62 
Reconfiguration of Tunisian Migration Politics after the  
'Arab Spring' - The Role of Young Civil Society Movements 
-  Inken Bartels 62 
 
Migration and Youth - A Moroccan Perspective 
-  Bachir Hamdouch 80 
 
Youth Unemployment in the Southern Mediterranean: 
Demographic Pressure, Human Development and Policies 








Youth, Revolt, Recognition. The Young Generation during and after the „Arab Spring“. 
Berlin 2015: Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/Humboldt University Berlin, edited volume by Isabel Schäfer. 
52 
 
The „Gezi Generation“: Youth, Polarization and the „New Turkey“ 
Gözde Böcü 
A Turkish Summer 
The Democratic Republic of Turkey, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, became a multi-
party system in the 1950s. Since then, Turkish democracy has been struggling to consolidate itself, 
facing major military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 to re-establish the elitist republican order, and 
has been coping with ethnic and religious polarization since the 1980s (Demirel 2005). After a decade 
of unstable coalition governments in the 1990s, the Islamic conservative party AKP (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi) came to power and has been leading the country for more than ten years (Aran 
2013). The controversy about the AKP’s party program and probable Islamic tendencies started in the 
aftermath of the elections in 2002. The liberal and secular parts of society especially assumed a sort 
of hidden Islamist agenda (Kurt & Alyanak 2011). After ten years of AKP rule it has become evident 
that it is not the Islamic agenda or the anti-republican stance, but rather the autocratic tendencies 
which represent the real problem (Tisdall 2013). In the last ten years the oppressive policies of the 
government seem to have incensed Turkish society more than expected, and eventually led to the 
democratic protest movement which started in Gezi Park in June 2013. 
Gezi Park is a rare green area in the heart of Istanbul. When the government decided to use the Gezi 
Park area to build another shopping mall for the city, the inhabitants of Istanbul protested against 
this top-down decision. When police used excessive violence against the peaceful environmental 
protestors in and around the park in order to clear it, a widespread resistance against the police and 
the governmental measures arose (Kilic 2013). Such a wide protest as the summer 2013 protest 
against the AKP government had never been seen before in the history of the Turkish Republic. 
Previous protests had mainly been organized by the secular elite and were not widely successful, 
because until 2007 the majority of the people stood behind the policies of the AKP, believing that it 
would continue the democratization process and bring an end to the series of military coups in 
Turkey (Atay 2013). 
More than a year after the protest the popular question “Quo vadis Turkey?” remains valid. What 
does the dominance of AKP in Turkish politics mean to the Gezi Generation and how can the 
increasing polarization of Turkish society be stopped? What role will young people play in the future 
and will they be able to influence mainstream politics in Turkey? This paper aims to provide an 
understanding of recent developments in Turkey by looking at the causes of the protest and 
increasing polarization within society, focusing mainly on the role of youth. 
The Gezi Spirit 
The protest’s famous slogan, which spread all around the world in June 2013, developed out of the 
area where it took place: Gezi Park in Istanbul’s Beyoglu District, next to Taksim Place. All protestors 
identified with the slogan “Everywhere is Taksim, Everywhere is resistance” when police forces 
cleared the area around Gezi Park in Istanbul (Kilic 2013). The events occurred after some 
environmentalists protested against plans to build a grand shopping mall, destroying one of 
Istanbul’s rare green spaces. Until that day activists had been holding peaceful protests in a space in 
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protestors offered readings, gatherings and concerts and even cleaned up the rubbish produced by 
the visitors (Catterall 2013). On May 31, the police responded harshly to the peaceful 
demonstrations, firing tear gas at the protestors and beating them. These violent acts by the Turkish 
police were widely condemned by other organizations and institutions, and by the Council of Europe 
(Europe 2013). Thanks to the widespread coverage on Facebook and Twitter, with pictures circulating 
all over the internet, the protest turned into a mass movement (Dorsey 2013). Within several days 
people had started to pay more attention to the protests and participated directly on the streets of 
Istanbul. The streets of Beyoglu, an area popular with tourists, became the main arena for the 
clashes between the police and the people. Within a short time, more than 3.5 million people all over 
Turkey had taken to the streets to protest against the Turkish government’s harsh measures against 
the peaceful demonstrators, whose aims were to fight for more democratic freedom and civil rights 
and to stop the repressive policies of the government (Özel 2014). The high number of injuries and 
the deaths of some protestors strengthened the uprising and made even more people come together 
(Ete 2013). In the final count, anti-government mass protests took place in 79 of Turkey’s 81 regions, 
demonstrating the extent of the movement (Seufert 2013).  
The Gezi movement was not only remarkable in its intensity but also because of the composition of 
its participants. For the first time in Turkish history, nearly all oppositional groups united around the 
same issue: Leftist, Kemalist, nationalist, pacifist, gay, anti-capitalist religious, Kurdish and Alevite 
groups demonstrated side by side on the streets (Aydın 2013). Their main purpose was to show their 
dissatisfaction with the government. Surveys conducted prior to the protest showed that almost 50% 
of Turkish citizens felt their lifestyle and freedoms to be under attack, believing the AKP to be 
pursuing a conservative agenda (Paul/Seyrek 2013). Another survey showed that only 10% of the 
protestors in the Gezi Movement were protesting for environmental reasons. The majority were 
there because of the increasing authoritarian and interventionist style of the government (Can 2013). 
Moreover, the protesters published their demands saying that they did not accept the imposition of 
religious or moral values or norms on society, and that they wished for a more participatory decision-
making system in the environment of a pluralist system that also respects the demands of minorities 
(Werz 2013). The underlying motivation for protesting was not about the park but rather about the 
wish to be heard by an increasingly deaf government.  
Why now? 
It is not the first time in Turkish history that the group in power has ignored and suppressed the 
other. Looking at the causes of the Gezi Park protests from only a short-term perspective would hide 
the real causes of the unsolved tensions in Turkish society. Therefore it is important to take a closer 
look at the long-term causes of the biggest protest movement in Turkish history.  
One of these long-term causes was the increasing polarization in Turkish politics and society: Turkish 
Society had faced polarization ever since the early years of the republic. Long before the conservative 
AKP-government came to power, Turkey struggled with increasing tension between different societal 
groups. When Atatürk and the state founders abolished the Caliphate and Sultanate in 1924, 
religious fraternities were banned and the secularist nation builders took over control of the state. 
Meanwhile, conservative parts of society, especially in rural areas remained unconvinced by the 
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voice of the Islamist and conservative parts of society turned into a huge political power source and 
into an opposing power base against the Kemalist set of ideas. The comeback of the Islamic social set 
of ideas started in the post-1980 military coup era, when conservative Turkish nationalism gained 
influence and the AKP consequently came to power in 2002 (Öncü 2014). 
Some therefore argue that one major reason why the Gezi protest occurred was the long known 
struggle for power over the state and society between the secular and religious parts of society. In 
fact the composition of the protesters as well as their complaints against the government and 
Erdogan strengthen this argument. Some of the policies implemented by the AKP over the past 
number of years have been interpreted as being anti-secular and slightly conservative, therefore 
extending the gap between the conservatives and other parts of society. After a period of 
democratization under the leadership of Erdogan, the stance of the AKP, its politics, and the rhetoric 
of some key personalities in the party have changed dramatically (Prodromoua 2012).  Starting from 
its second term in government, Erdogan and his party clashed with the old ideological basis of the 
Turkish state, beginning with the republican elite and other secular powers in the country such as the 
military. Over time the AKP managed to marginalize it and disable the opposition by means which 
were not always considered democratic. Some judicial cases such as Ergenekon and Balyoz arose, in 
which the state accused intellectual, bureaucratic, military and media people of planning a coup 
against the AKP government to eliminate it (Gürsoy 2012). Although in the beginning some parts of 
society such as leftist and Kurdish groups agreed to these trials because they only targeted the old 
Kemalist elite, all non-conservative parts of society would later feel their freedoms and lifestyle 
limited by the AKP. 
The AKP government and its members, especially in the person of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, started to 
target the private lives of nearly all non-religious groups. When looking at the public statements of 
Erdogan between 2005 and 2013, we can clearly identify this kind of intervention. In most of his 
public statements, Erdogan targets the old elite by referring to abolishing symbols and important 
aspects of the traces of Atatürk in public life. Just before the protest started, for instance, he 
intended to change the name of the state bank T.C. Ziraat Bankasi by eliminating the prefix T.C. 
which stands for Turkish Republic and selling it to a foreign company (HürriyetDailyNews 2013). The 
secular elites saw this attempt as a symbolic fight against the Turkish Republic and its secular 
character. Another factor which angered not only the Kemalist part of society was that he called the 
founders of the Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his friend Ismet Inönü “two drunks” (Yetkin 
2013). As many people at least respect the memory of Atatürk as a state founder these words were 
highly insulting and angered not only the secular part of society, but the majority of Turkish people 
(Idiz 2013). 
Erdogan has targeted not only the Kemalist part of society, but nearly all groups who do not share his 
values and world beliefs. On several occasions Erdogan managed to insult the religious stance of 
Alavites, criticized the drinking behavior of students and tried to dictate a new lifestyle for women in 
his speeches. His wish to press Turkish society into the frame of Islamic conservatism became evident 
when he announced his wish to raise a “religious generation (dindar genclik)” in 2012. Not only was 
his wish to educate future generations in Turkey, he also wanted half of society, namely women, to 
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other political figures of the AKP touched on the issue of women by telling them to have at least 
three children and that abortion would be considered murder very soon (Erdogan 2013). There exist 
many other examples from the last decade which easily illustrate how the AKP and Erdogan have 
increased the societal gap between its party and its supporters and other parts of society. Some even 
see a constant rise in the polarization of society in terms of secularism, religion and ethnicity from 
one electoral success of the party to another (Keyman 2014). Therefore we can speak of a gradual 
socio-political marginalization of the non-conservative parts of society in the past decade under the 
rule of the AKP as one of the long-term causes of the protest. 
Capitalism, Conservative Bourgeoisie and Marginalization of Youth  
While protest waves kicked off around the world in 2011, Turkish citizens were following the 
incidents in the Middle East, Greece and other parts of the world closely. However, by that time 
nobody predicted any similar movement in Turkey. For many years everything seemed under control: 
the military was brought under civil oversight, constitutional amendments were made according to 
the EU accession process and economic growth seemed unstoppable.  Erdogan and his party were 
building successfully on Turkey’s two-decade-long economic liberalization and were steadily raising 
the national income (Özel 2014). But with the AKP consolidating its position by centralizing and 
monopolizingpower, a process started which led later to the Gezi movement and to a situation in 
which they became the victims of their own success. The economic boom mainly led to the rise of a 
new conservative bourgeoisie rather than to the establishment of a large middle class inclusive of 
and open to all parts of society. Some claimed that those who benefited most from the economic 
development under the AKP-rule were supporters of the government who gained power through the 
indirect patronage system (Aknur 2014). With the rule of law and many other state institutions under 
the monopole of the AKP-government it seemed very unlikely for non-conservative parts of society 
to gain access to those somewhat state-controlled entities. Accordingly, some argue that this led to 
the socio-economic marginalization of the highly educated, more liberal, mainly young groups, and 
influenced their will to protest (Aknur 2014). Having analyzed some long-term factors, it can be 
argued that the government determined its own destiny by systematically marginalizing all non-
conservative groups of society, economically, politically and socially. To understand the role, 
demands and composition of this marginalized group we have to take a look at the major player in 
the Gezi protest movement: the marginalized youth.  
The “Gezi Generation”  
Immediately after the protest the big question was: who are these people in Gezi Park? According to 
the government they were “extremists” or “terrorists”. The government even encouraged conspiracy 
theories and claimed that the protestors were led by the so-called interest lobby or foreign forces 
who only wanted to harm Turkey and its thriving economy (Werz 2013). Scholars on the other hand 
assumed that the majority of the people who protested belonged to the middle class segments of 
Turkey, who had enjoyed a good education and who were internationally connected (Seufert 2013). 
Keeping in mind that those who died during the protest were all aged between 19 and 27 allows us 
to assume that it was the younger segment of society who protested. Even the group who started 
the protest Taksim Solidarity (Taksim Dayanismasi) on May 27 was mainly a group of university 
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Municipality (Keyman 2014). These aspects allow us to raise the question of the role and 
participation of youth during the Gezi protest (Kulu 2013). Polls conducted during the protest 
showed that the average age of the people participating in the demonstrations was 28. Almost 50% 
of the protestors were under the age of 30 (KONDA 2014). Moreover, one in every four protestors 
was a student, thus strengthening the perception of a young movement in Gezi (Can 2013). One year 
after the protest we know more about the movement and its participants and are able to label the 
major group involved in the protest as young, urban, educated and non-ideological (Özel 2014). 
Therefore some started to speak of a “Gezi Generation”, characterized by a group of people who 
were younger than 30 and who were maybe born in the 1990s, mainly grew up during the rule of the 
AKP and who now resist this rule and the government’s wish to raise a religious generation (Atay 
2013). Until the Gezi protests this societal group was invisible on the political stage and was 
considered to be uninterested in politics (Belge 2013). Young Turkish people became visible in the 
political arena when the Gezi protest broke out and when mainly youngsters lost their lives during 
clashes with the police, such as 21-year-old Ali Ismail Korkmaz. It was young people like him who 
turned into key figures for the young protestors while thousands of others were injured 
(Becatoros/Fraser 2013).  
It was young people who made the difference during the Gezi protest especially when it came to 
taking part in the protests. One particularly important protest resource which only the youngsters 
could contribute to the protest was the use of social media. Looking at the new protest movements 
all around the world we can clearly identify the impact of social media on the protests in Egypt, 
Tunisia and Greece. Current research on the influence of social media during protests appear to 
validate this assumption. Della Porta and Mosca put forward the view that social media is one of 
today’s most important resources for the organization, implementation and success of a protest 
(Porta/Mosca 2005). Another major assumption in the literature is that social media have a high 
influence on the mobilization of participants for the protest. The use of social media tools such as 
Facebook, Twitter and other similar media not only to inform, but also to invite people to the 
protests increases the number of participants (Eltantawy/Wiest 2011). Other scholars emphasize an 
identity-forming role of social media. According to their view it is easier to create a communal spirit 
when interaction takes place on the streets as well as online (Garrett 2006).  
Keeping a look at the use of those new communication technologies during the Gezi protest supports 
these theoretical assumptions. Firstly, over 35 million people in Turkey use the internet on a daily 
basis. Moreover Turkish people are the third largest national group on Facebook and most of them 
are younger users (Karabag/Coskun 2013). This shows how important the role of the internet in 
Turkey is and the potential of the resource that was lying in the hands of the protestors. Therefore, it 
is not a surprise that protesters used these social media resources during the protests to 
communicate, mobilize and inform each other about current developments. Some Twitter data 
analysis showed that the use of the internet and social media as such was an important tool for the 
Gezi revolt and that Twitter turned out to be the best tool for uprisings. It turned out that the vast 
majority of Turkish Twitter users used hashtags supportive of the protest, whereas only a small 
minority of Twitter users from Turkey supported the government on social media. Another important 
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but the eastern province of Dersim where most “resist” hashtags were used (Champion 2013). This 
shows the considerable impact of social media in spreading the movement outside of the city of 
Istanbul (Dorsey 2013).  
Apart from mobilizing and informing the protestors, another important impact of the use of social 
media during the protest was the identity-shaping of protesters through online media. With the 
utilization of social media came the spread of sarcastic comments and art about the government and 
especially about Erdogan himself. Laughing together meant solidarity for the youngsters. In a short 
time, young people developed new forms of protest (Dagli 2013). Some of these sarcastic pieces 
turned into nationwide resistance symbols, such as “the girl in the red dress” or “the standing man”. 
The distribution of these artistic symbols was especially effective on Twitter. The girl in the red dress 
was photographed during the very first days of the protest when a police officer gassed her without 
reason. Different artist tried to address this incident by reproducing it in different artistic mediums. 
Not only were the protestors caricatured but also pictures of the PM during his rallies in Ankara or 
Istanbul were sarcastically used by the social media community. For instance, the chequered jacket 
of the PM which he wore at a rally in Ankara, was not fashionable enough for the Gezi youth, and 
was seen as a symbol of the backwardness of the PM. Many other sarcastic works were influenced 
this (TEMPO 2013).  
These are only some examples of the creative, sarcastic art pieces produced by young people and 
spread via social media to oppose the government. Keeping in mind that Turkish media suffer from 
state censorship and that many journalists are in jail due to their critical and investigative journalism, 
it is natural that youth used this tool. Moreover it can be argued that the social media environment 
was for a long time the only secure place left where youth could fight back without fearing any direct 
punishment by the state during the protests. We can therefore argue that the use of social media by 
young segments of society was unique and an important contribution to the protest. It clearly 
increased the mobilization of participants and helped to built up a common spirit for the protest. 
Given the centrality of this aspect during the Gezi protest, the role of social media and youth should 
not be underestimated for future perspectives on the development of Turkish democracy.  
The Aftermath of the Gezi Protests   
More than one year after the Gezi protests, not much is left from the initial Gezi Spirit and its Gezi 
Generation. According to some scholars, Gezi lacked the necessary momentum to become a fully 
bureaucratized movement because of the involvement of radical groups and the fact that the united 
groups went back to their old habits immediately after the protest. Although incidents such as the 
corruption scandal in December 2013 or the death of the youngest Gezi protestor Berkin Elvan 269 
days after the protest meant a short re-awakening of the Gezi spirit, the movement never fully 
revived again (Inceoglu 2014).  
The electoral process starting in March 2014 marked the end of the Gezi movement and the making 
of extra-institutional politics in Turkey. With mainstream political parties re-entering the political 
stage, extra-institutional claims were no longer valid. The illusion or the hope that challenging the 
authoritarianism of the AKP by campaigning and voting was still possible hindered the preservation 
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hoping for the emergence of new politicians or leaders from the Gezi Generation. In fact, a “Gezi 
Party” was founded in October 2013 aimed at influencing the political process. It was supported by a 
mixture of young and old, left-wing and conservative mainly university students and led by the neo-
classical metal musician Resit Cem Köksal (Aknur 2014). After the outcome of the March 2014 local 
elections all hopes that the Gezi Party might play a role for the future of Turkey disappeared: Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan and his party won the elections and remained in power (Carkoglu 2014). After the 
local elections people opposing the government hoped that at least the presidential elections might 
show a better outcome. Most of them did not believe that the polarizing figure of Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan would persuade the majority of Turkey. Despite everything, Erdogan was elected President 
of the Turkish Republic on 10 August 2014 by a large majority of the votes (Seufert 2014). According 
to observers the recent electoral success and the dominance of the AKP for the last seven elections 
marked the end of pluralist democracy and finally also of Gezi (Keyman 2014).  
Nonetheless, underestimating the future role of the Gezi movement and youth by reviewing its 
impact only by looking at electoral outcomes would be wrong. The success of Gezi and the impact of 
the Gezi Generation should not be reduced only to these electoral outcomes, but should be 
reconsidered from different perspectives. Although the Gezi protests could not be translated into the 
institutional sphere, its major achievement was that helped the marginalized parts of society, 
especially the socio-economically marginalized youth, to overcome their fears and to resist the 
government. The Gezi protests also achieved the revitalizing of civil society: during and after the Gezi 
protest, various old and new organizations, many led by young activists, came together to influence 
mainstream politics. For instance the establishment of an organization called “Vote and Beyond (Oy 
ve Ötesi)” which aimed to prevent fraud during the local elections by assigning a volunteer for each 
ballot box attracted public attention (Inceoglu 2014). These are only some aspects which illustrate 
the change brought about in Turkish society and politics by the protest movement in the summer of 
2013.  
Is Winter Coming? 
Although different scenarios for the future of Turkey are debated it seems very likely that the 
polarization between the different sets of society will steadily increase. Erdogan has taken no step 
back since the Gezi protest and it is very unlikely that he will do so in the future. Analyses have 
shown that with every step consolidating his power, his politics has become more and more 
polarizing. In Erdogan’s personal utopia, which he terms “New Turkey”, there is apparently no place 
for those who do not accept his definition of democracy (Seufert 2014). Criticism, checks and 
balances and participatory democracy seemed to have no place in the New Turkey. In fact for the 
first time in history, Turkey is not only facing the risk of being polarized but also of becoming a more 
and more divided society (Keyman 2014). Keeping the general political situation of Turkey in mind, 
Turkish youth and those who see themselves as part of the Gezi Generation will have to prepare for 
difficult times. Social media have been and will be one of the only free tool available to young 
people. However, remembering several attempts by the government to shut down YouTube and turn 
off Twitter, we can see that freedom of speech does not appeal to the President and his perception 
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further complicate this situation. Nevertheless, as long as young people keep organizing and as long 
as social media is available, there is still some hope and it is called the “Gezi Generation”. 
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